Contribute to the cybersecurity survey asking the questions others didn't dare to... Click here

Information Security Management

ISO 27001 Clause 6: Planning

Clause 6 is a heavyweight in ISO 27001, where you conduct risk management and set objectives.

Essentially, ISO 27001 Clause 6 is the planning stage,where you decide how to address the risks identified to your information and how to seize opportunities to improve security.

Written By: Alan Parker, ISO 27001 Consultant
Last Updated: 27/4/26



What is ISO 27001 Clause 6 Planning in 3 Minutes

Alan Parker ISO 27001 Consultant
Written by Alan Parker – ISO 27001 Consultant

What are the subclauses of ISO 27001 Clause 6: Planning?

There are three main clauses within clause 6. Most of the detail is in clause 6.1 (which in turn has 6.1.1 – 6.1.3), and deals with how the organisation handles security risks.

  • 6.1 Actions to Address Risks & Opportunities
  • 6.2 Information Security Objectives & Planning to Achieve Them
  • 6.3 Planning of Changes

ISO 27001 Clause 6 โ€” Planning

How risk drives objectives, objectives drive action, and changes are kept under control

6.1
Actions to Address Risks and Opportunities
The risk engine โ€” assess, evaluate, treat, and document. The primary outputs of the ISMS are produced here.
โš™ The Engine
6.1.1 โ€” General
Identify What Needs to Be Addressed
Determine risks and opportunities arising from context (Clause 4) and interested parties
Ensure the ISMS can achieve its intended outcomes
Prevent or reduce undesired effects
Achieve continual improvement
6.1.2 โ€” Risk Assessment
Establish, Apply, and Document
Define risk acceptance criteria and assessment criteria
Identify information security risks and their owners
Analyse likelihood and consequence of each risk
Evaluate and prioritise risks for treatment
6.1.3 โ€” Risk Treatment
Select, Plan, and Record
Select appropriate treatment options for each risk
Determine controls โ€” reference Annex A as a starting point
Produce Statement of Applicability (SoA)
Formulate Risk Treatment Plan; obtain risk owner sign-off
Risk context informs
6.2
Information Security Objectives and Planning to Achieve Them
Translate risk decisions into measurable, actionable targets with clear ownership and timelines
What objectives must be
Consistent with the IS policy
Measurable where practicable
Mindful of applicable IS requirements
Monitored, communicated, and updated as needed
Documented as information
Planning for each objective must address
What will be done
What resources are required
Who is responsible
When it will be completed
How results will be evaluated
Changes governed by
6.3
Planning of Changes
Changes to the ISMS must be made in a planned, considered manner โ€” not reactively or in an uncontrolled way
New in 2022
Changes to the ISMS โ€” scope, controls, processes โ€” must be carried out in a planned manner
Purpose and consequences of the change must be considered before implementation
Ensures ISMS integrity is maintained as the organisation evolves and grows
Formalises what good organisations already do โ€” links to change management procedures
Clause 6 delivers
The three core outputs that drive the rest of the ISMS
๐Ÿ“‹
Risk Register
The documented record of identified risks, their assessed likelihood and impact, owners, and current status
๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ
Risk Treatment Plan
The action plan for treating risks โ€” what controls will be implemented, by whom, and by when
โœ…
Statement of Applicability
The definitive record of which Annex A controls apply, which are excluded, and the justification for each decision

Clause 6.3 (Planning of Changes) was added in the 2022 update. The clause structure of 6.1 (with sub-clauses 6.1.1-6.1.3) and 6.2 stayed the same. No other material changes.

Let’s take a look at each one in detail.


Clause 6.1 โ€“ Actions to Address Risks and Opportunities

Clause 6.1 is about risk management planning.

The full title is โ€œActions to address risks and opportunities,โ€ which encompasses identifying what could go wrong (risks) and also considering factors that could enhance security (opportunities).

A typical risk management process

In practice, this clause includes a few sub-requirements:


6.1.1 General

This part sets the stage for planning to address risks and opportunities, considering the issues (from 4.1) and requirements (from 4.2).

Itโ€™s a general statement that your risk process should consider the context and interested parties. The main meat comes in 6.1.2 and 6.1.3.


6.1.2 Information Security Risk Assessment

The standard asks you to establish and implement a risk assessment process here.

You need to identify information security risks associated with the loss of confidentiality, integrity and availability of information within the scope of your ISMS.

There are lots of ways to identify risks and lots of sources. Here are some;

Risk Identification Methods

  • Workshops & Interviews โ€“ Gather input from staff across departments.
  • Brainstorming โ€“ Collaborative sessions to surface potential risks.
  • Checklists โ€“ Based on ISO 27001 Annex A or other frameworks.
  • Scenario Analysis โ€“ Explore โ€œwhat-ifโ€ situations.
  • Asset-Threat-Vulnerability Model โ€“ Map risks by linking assets to threats and vulnerabilities.
  • Historical Incidents โ€“ Review past security breaches or near-misses.

Risk Identification Sources

  • Annex A controls โ€“ Use as prompts for areas of concern. (We’ll come back to Annex A, and the Statement of Applicability in a moment)
  • Internal audits & assessments
  • Regulatory and legal requirements
  • Industry threat intelligence/news
  • Customer requirements or SLAs
  • IT system logs and monitoring reports

Risk Assessments

Once you’ve captured your risks in your risk log (in whatever format you deem best), you need to assess them. This is commonly done by scoring the risks using a method such as the following scoring approach for likelihood and impact.

Risk Likelihood scale with ratings and scores.
A likelihood scoring scale
Risk impact scale with ratings and scores
An impact scoring scale
Risk scoring matrix of impact * liklihood.
A risk scoring matrix – impact x likelihood = overall risk score

Once you’ve mapped your risks, you can prioritise them based on their scores.


6.1.3 Information Security Risk Treatment

Once you know your risks, this sub-clause requires you to design and implement a risk treatment plan. For each unacceptable risk, you decide on a treatment option:

The Four ISO 27001 Risk Treatment Options

Clause 6.1.3 requires you to select appropriate options โ€” none is inherently better than another

🛡
Option 1
Mitigate
Most common
Apply controls that reduce likelihood, impact, or both. Residual risk remains โ€” it must be assessed and formally accepted.
Use when
Risk is within scope of available Annex A controls
Cost of controls is proportionate to the risk level
The underlying activity must continue
MFA + access reviews + encryption reduce risk of unauthorised data access to an acceptable residual level
🚫
Option 2
Avoid
Underused
Decide not to engage in the activity that creates the risk. Eliminates the risk at source โ€” but only if the decision is deliberate and documented.
Use when
Risk cannot be adequately mitigated or transferred
The activity creating the risk is not essential
Regulatory or reputational exposure is too high
Decision not to process sensitive personal data categories because the risk profile is unacceptable given current controls
🤝
Option 3
Transfer
Partial only
Shift financial or operational consequences to a third party โ€” typically through insurance. Does not reduce likelihood or transfer regulatory accountability.
Use when
Financial consequence exceeds what you can absorb
Specialist capability exists externally (e.g. incident response)
Used alongside mitigation โ€” not instead of it
Cyber insurance covers breach response costs โ€” paired with technical controls to reduce likelihood
Option 4
Accept
Needs sign-off
Make a deliberate, documented decision to live with the risk. Not the same as ignoring it โ€” requires formal acceptance by the risk owner with appropriate authority.
Use when
Risk falls within defined risk acceptance criteria
Cost of treatment exceeds the potential impact
No practical treatment option is available
Low-likelihood risk accepted after review โ€” risk owner sign-off recorded, reviewed annually
Key principles
Options can be combinedMitigate + Transfer is common
Residual risk must be assessedAfter treatment, not before
Acceptance needs authorityRisk owner, not just ISMS lead
Document the reasoningNot just the option chosen
Transfer does not reduce likelihood โ€” and does not transfer regulatory accountability. Cyber insurance is a financial safety net, not a substitute for controls.

Risk Treatment Plan – What to Capture

Risk Treatment Plan: What to Capture

A mandatory document under ISO 27001 โ€” linking each risk to its treatment option, controls, owner, and residual risk

Risk ID
Risk description
Option
Controls / action
Owner
Residual risk
Accepted by
R-014
Unauthorised access to customer data via compromised credentials
Mitigate
MFA enforced; quarterly access reviews; password policy
IT Manager
Low
ISMS Lead
R-021
Ransomware encrypts business-critical systems โ€” extended outage
Mitigate + Transfer
Offline backups; EDR; network segmentation; cyber insurance
IT Manager
Medium
CEO
R-033
Data loss due to inadequate supplier security controls
Mitigate
Supplier assessment; security clauses in contracts; annual review
Ops Manager
Low
ISMS Lead
R-047
Accidental data exposure via shadow IT / unsanctioned apps
Avoid
Policy prohibiting unsanctioned tools; training; MDM enforcement
HR Manager
Low
ISMS Lead
R-058
Website defacement causing reputational damage (low-value target)
Accept
Standard hosting security in place โ€” no additional controls required
IT Manager
Low
ISMS Lead
Treatment option
Mitigate, Avoid, Transfer, or Accept โ€” options can be combined for a single risk
Controls / action
Specific measures being applied โ€” link to Annex A controls where applicable
Residual risk
The risk level after controls are applied โ€” must fall within your acceptance criteria
Accepted by
Named person with authority to accept residual risk โ€” the risk owner, not just the ISMS lead
The risk treatment plan is mandatory documented information under ISO 27001. Auditors will check that treatment decisions are recorded, residual risk is assessed, and acceptance is formally authorised โ€” not just implied.

The Statement of Applicability

ISO 27001 expects you to select appropriate controls to reduce risks. Many of these controls will come from Annex A (which provides a comprehensive list of 93 control objectives and controls in the 2022 version).

Importantly, Clause 6.1.3 has a specific required output: the Statement of Applicability (SoA).

an example of the statement of applicability from ISO 27001
An example of the Statement of Applicability

The Statement of Applicability is a document in which you list all controls from Annex A (and any additional controls you choose outside Annex A) and declare whether each control is applicable to your ISMS and, if so, whether itโ€™s implemented or not.

You also provide a brief justification for inclusion or exclusion.

Example:ย Control A.9.4.1 (Physical Security Perimeter)ย is deemedย Applicable and Implemented; justification: We have an office space that needs physical protection, door locks, and CCTV. Or Control A.14.2.7 (Outsourced development) โ€“ (or) Not applicable; justification: We do not outsource software development. T

The SoA essentially maps risks to controls, ensuring you donโ€™t overlook any control. Itโ€™s also a key document that the auditors review to understand your control setโ€‹. Think of it as the bridge between your risk assessment and Annex A.

After determining controls, you also form a Risk Treatment Planโ€”usually a table listing each risk, the chosen treatment/control, the responsible person, and a timeline. Often, organisations combine the risk register and treatment plan into one matrix that shows risk details and the planned controls or actions.

ISO 27001 Full Document Toolkit

Every document your auditor
expects to see.

130 Word & Excel templates, ready to edit. Policies, risk register, Statement of Applicability, audit pack, staff communications โ€” all updated for ISO 27001:2022.

130 templates

Instant download

Written by practising consultant

ISO 27001:2022

Opportunities

While the standard heavily emphasises risk (negative things), it also says to consider opportunities. This could be interpreted as any chance to improve security or business that you identify.

For example, an opportunity might be โ€œby adopting a new cloud service, we could improve security and efficiency.โ€ Opportunities are often implicitly addressed by setting improvement objectives (Clause 6.2).

The standard doesnโ€™t require a separate โ€œopportunities registerโ€ or anything; just keep in mind that not everything is doom and gloomโ€”if thereโ€™s a beneficial initiative that enhances security, thatโ€™s an opportunity to note.

Additionally, ISO 27001:2022 introduced Clause 6.1.4 (in effect), which is not numbered but included: it states that you must consider the controls in Annex A as part of your risk treatment (which you do via the SoA).

ISO 27001:2013, older version of the standard, explicitly mentioned โ€œcontrol objectives and controls from Annex A must be compared against your controlsโ€โ€”in 2022, they simplified the wording, but the expectation is the same: use Annex A as a checklist to ensure youโ€™ve considered all typical controls.

Outputs from 6.1: The outputs here are Risk Assessment methodology/process description (some doc describing how you do risk assessment โ€“ criteria, scoring, etc.), Risk Assessment results (risk register), Risk Treatment Plan, and Statement of Applicability.

These are all vital documents for ISO 27001. The standard explicitly requires the SoA; you must show risk assessment documentation to the auditor. Many auditors say the risk assessment and SoA are the heart of ISO 27001.


Clause 6.2 โ€“ Information Security Objectives and Planning to Achieve Them

ISO 27001 Clause 6.2 asks you to set information security objectives at relevant functions and levels and to make plans for achieving those objectives.

Think of this as goal-setting to improve or maintain security. Objectives should be consistent with the information security policy (for example, if your policy says โ€œwe continuously improve securityโ€, an objective could be โ€œimplement three security improvements this yearโ€).

They should be measurable, if possible, or at least evaluable, and have defined outcomes. They also need to consider applicable requirements and results from risk assessment.

For an SME, typical security objectives might be:

  • Reduce the number of virus/malware incidents to zero for the year.
  • Achieve 100% staff completion of security awareness training by Q4.
  • Improve backup recovery success rate to 100% (test all critical system restores successfully this year).
  • Pass the ISO 27001 certification audit by [target date] (that can be a valid objective during implementation).
  • Encrypt all laptops by the end of Q2.

Objectives can be both ongoing targets or project-like goals. The standard then requires that for each objective, you determine who will be responsible, what will be done, what resources will be required, when it will be completed, and how results will be evaluated.

This is essentially an action plan for each objective. You can maintain this as an โ€œobjectives and plansโ€ table or as part of a management plan document.

For instance, if the objective is to encrypt laptops by Q2, the plan might say: The IT Manager will deploy encryption software to all 50 laptops, the budget is X, it is to be done by June 30, and success will be measured by verification that all devices show encryption enabled.

Key point – Objectives should be revisited regularly (like in management reviews) to see if theyโ€™re met or need updates. For initial certification, the auditor will verify that you have set objectives and plans. In later surveillance audits, theyโ€™ll look for evidence that you executed those plans and perhaps set new ones.


Clause 6.3 โ€“ Planning of Changes

Clause 6.3 was added in the 2022 update. Of the three changes to ISO 27001:2022, it’s the smallest in word count but probably the most under-discussed in practice. The standard says simply that “when the organisation determines the need for changes to the information security management system, the changes shall be carried out in a planned manner.”

In other words: don’t change the ISMS without thinking about it first.

That sounds obvious, but it’s a clause born from real-world experience. Auditors had been seeing ISMSs that worked perfectly at certification, then quietly fell apart over the following 12-24 months because changes were made ad hoc – new products added without scope updates, departments restructured without role re-assignments, cloud platforms migrated without risk reviews. 6.3 is the standard’s response to that pattern.

What counts as a “significant change” to the ISMS?

The standard doesn’t define this deliberately. In my experience, the changes most likely to trigger 6.3 in an SME are:

  • Scope changes – adding a new business unit, location, or service to the ISMS
  • Major system or platform migrations – moving from one cloud provider to another, replacing a core business application
  • Organisational restructures – mergers, acquisitions, significant headcount changes that affect ISMS roles
  • New regulatory or contractual requirements that materially change what the ISMS needs to address
  • New product or service launches that introduce new data flows or risks
  • Changes to top management – particularly the ISMS sponsor or lead

Routine changes (a new starter joining, a minor process tweak, a software update) don’t need formal 6.3 treatment. Use judgment – the question is whether the change could meaningfully affect the integrity of the ISMS.

What does 6.3 actually require you to do?

When a significant change is needed, the standard asks you to consider four things: the purpose of the change and its consequences, the integrity of the ISMS (will the change break anything?), resource availability (do you have what you need to make the change properly?), and the allocation or reallocation of responsibilities (do roles need to update?).

In practice, this looks like a short structured note – sometimes just an email, sometimes a one-page record – that captures the change, its impact, the actions taken, and any updates needed to ISMS documentation (risk register, SoA, scope statement, roles document).

Where 6.3 connects to other clauses

6.3 doesn’t sit in isolation. It connects to:

  • Clause 4.4 – the ISMS itself, since changes affect its scope and operation
  • Clause 6.1 – significant changes typically warrant a fresh risk assessment
  • Clause 9.3 – management review explicitly requires you to consider “changes that could affect the ISMS”
  • Clause 10 – if a change creates a nonconformity, the corrective action process kicks in

Documentation and Outputs for Clause 6

Clause 6 generates some of the most important documentation in the ISMS:

A document describing how you perform risk assessments (criteria for risk evaluation, scoring system, etc.). Not always formally required by the standard text, but itโ€™s practically necessary to ensure repeatability. Auditors often ask, โ€œHow do you do risk assessment here?โ€ and this doc answers that.

These records identified risks, their scores, and initial status. Often, an Excel sheet or table. It should show youโ€™ve considered risks across the scope.

Mandatory record: While ISO 27001 doesnโ€™t explicitly list โ€œrisk registerโ€ as mandatory, itโ€™s implied because you must demonstrate youโ€™ve identified risks and decided how to treat them. (Also, in Annex A control A.5.9, inventory of assets is a similar required artefact feeding into risk assessmentโ€‹.)

A listing of what you will do for each unacceptable risk โ€“ essentially, action items to implement controls. This can be combined with or separated from the risk register. Auditors will check that for each high/medium risk, thereโ€™s a corresponding treatment.

Mandatory document. This is a cornerstone output of Clause 6. It should list all Annex A controls (93 of them in the 2022 version) and for each, whether itโ€™s applied in your ISMS or not, with justification and statusโ€‹. Ensure this document is current and accurate when you go to audit. It maps to Clause 6.1.3 d).

Auditors scrutinise the SoA to see if your controls make sense. They might also use it to sample controls to verify implementation (e.g., if SoA says antivirus is implemented per control A.8.23, they might later ask to see it in action).

You should have documented security objectives (Clause 6.2), typically in a list or in the ISMS manual. Also, evidence of planning for each (like an โ€œobjectives action planโ€ table or entries in a project plan). This must be documented (the objectives themselves, and planning information, could serve as a record).

This one can be informal. If you made changes to the ISMS (like mid-year deciding to add a new control or a new department), it’s good to have a note of how you planned it (e.g., an email or meeting minutes). Some might maintain a change log for ISMS changes. At a minimum, incorporate change considerations in your procedures.


What Auditors Look For in Clause 6

Clause 6 โ€” What Auditors Look For

Six areas auditors examine to confirm that planning is genuine, systematic, and evidenced

โš ๏ธ
The auditor's core concern: Clause 6 is where the ISMS either earns credibility or falls apart. Auditors are specifically looking for evidence that risk assessment is a real, repeatable process โ€” not a one-off spreadsheet exercise carried out to obtain a certificate. The SoA and Risk Treatment Plan are scrutinised closely, and discrepancies between what is documented and what is actually implemented are a common source of major findings.
โš™๏ธ
Risk Assessment Process
Clause 6.1.2
What they're assessing
A documented, repeatable methodology exists โ€” not an ad hoc approach
Risk acceptance and assessment criteria are defined and consistently applied
The process produces comparable, reproducible results across different assessors
Assessments are reviewed periodically โ€” not just at initial certification
Typical questions asked
Walk me through how you conduct a risk assessment.
How do you define your risk acceptance criteria, and who approved them?
When was the last risk assessment carried out, and what triggered it?
๐Ÿ”Ž
Comprehensiveness of Risk Identification
Clause 6.1.2
What they're assessing
Risks are identified against all assets in scope โ€” not just technical infrastructure
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability are all considered for each asset
Threats and vulnerabilities are explicitly considered, not just high-level risk categories
Each identified risk has a named owner accountable for it
Typical questions asked
How did you identify the assets included in your risk assessment?
What threat sources did you consider, and how did you arrive at that list?
How do you ensure significant risks haven't been missed?
โš–๏ธ
Risk Treatment Decisions
Clause 6.1.3
What they're assessing
Treatment options (mitigate, accept, avoid, transfer) are documented with clear rationale
Accepted risks are formally signed off by a risk owner with appropriate authority
Control selections map logically to the risks they are treating
Residual risk levels are recorded and within the stated acceptance criteria
Typical questions asked
Who approved the decision to accept this risk, and when?
Why was this control chosen over the alternatives?
How do you determine when a risk has been treated to an acceptable level?
๐Ÿ“„
Statement of Applicability (SoA)
Mandatory document
What they're assessing
All 93 Annex A controls are accounted for โ€” included or explicitly excluded
Exclusion justifications are substantive โ€” not simply "not applicable" without reasoning
Included controls are linked to evidence of actual implementation, not just policy intent
The SoA is current, version-controlled, and approved โ€” not a static document from implementation
Typical questions asked
How do you justify the exclusion of this Annex A control?
Where can I see evidence that this control is actually implemented?
When was the SoA last reviewed, and what prompted the review?
๐Ÿ—บ๏ธ
Risk Treatment Plan Execution
Clause 6.1.3
What they're assessing
The Risk Treatment Plan is being actively worked โ€” not filed and forgotten after certification
Each action has a named owner, a target date, and a current status
Overdue actions are tracked and escalated โ€” there is a process, not just a spreadsheet
Completed actions have evidence of implementation, not just a status of "done"
Typical questions asked
Who owns this treatment action, and what have they done to address it?
This action is overdue โ€” what is the current status and what has caused the delay?
Can you show me evidence that this control has been implemented?
๐ŸŽฏ
Information Security Objectives
Clause 6.2
What they're assessing
Objectives are specific and measurable โ€” not vague aspirations like "improve security"
Each objective links logically to the IS policy and the organisation's risk context
Progress is actively monitored with records โ€” not just stated at management review once a year
Objectives have been communicated to relevant staff and functions
Typical questions asked
How do you measure progress against this objective, and where are those records?
When were these objectives last reviewed and updated?
How were the objectives communicated to staff who are responsible for contributing to them?

During a customerโ€™s ISO 27001 risk assessment, 30 or so major risks were identified, including โ€œUnauthorised access to customer database due to weak passwords.โ€ It was scored as high impact, medium likelihood. The selected treatment was to implement multi-factor authentication (MFA), mapped to the Annex A control on authentication. All pretty standard.

The auditor reviewed the risk register at the audit and noted the treatment plan: โ€œMFA to be implemented by Q4, responsible: IT Security Lead.โ€ They asked if MFA had been implemented and requested evidence, such as access logs. It was okay because it existed.

If the target date is in the future, auditors assess whether the risk is actively managed โ€” checking for interim controls and alignment with the SoA (e.g. authentication control marked โ€œPlannedโ€). In this case, because the risk, treatment, and SoA were consistent and coherent, the auditor was satisfied that Clause 6 was working effectively.


Common Mistakes in Clause 6

In ten-plus years of helping organisations through Clause 6, certain mistakes come up so often I can almost predict them at the start of an engagement. None of them is fatal on its own, but they add up – and Clause 6 is where audit findings tend to cluster.

Building a risk register from a generic template. Risk registers downloaded from the internet, or lifted wholesale from a previous engagement, almost always contain risks that don’t apply and miss risks that do. Your context (Clause 4) is unique, so your risk register should be too. I’ve sat in audits where the auditor spotted “loss of physical access cards” on a register for a fully remote SaaS company – the kind of giveaway that suggests no genuine risk thinking has happened.

Confusing risk acceptance with not addressing the risk. Risk acceptance is a deliberate, documented decision that the risk falls within your acceptance criteria. Ignoring a risk because nobody’s got round to it isn’t acceptance – it’s negligence. Auditors will spot the difference within five minutes of opening the risk register.

Marking an Annex A control “Not Applicable” without genuine justification. “Not applicable” should be the conclusion of a real assessment, not a shortcut. I see this most often with controls around physical security (“we’re remote, so this doesn’t apply”) – which can be a defensible position, but only if you’ve actually thought about laptops, paper documents, and home working, and concluded none of it warrants the control. “Not applicable,” with a one-line dismissive justification, will be challenged.

Setting objectives that aren’t measurable. “Improve security culture” isn’t an objective. “100% staff completion of phishing training by Q3” is. The standard explicitly requires measurable objectives where practicable – and an objective without a metric is something nobody will check, nobody will achieve, and the auditor will flag.

Skipping risk owners. Every risk in your register needs an owner – a named individual or role accountable for the risk’s treatment and review. “The IT team” isn’t an owner; “the CTO” is. Risks without owners drift, and auditors routinely check this.

Treating risk assessment as an annual one-off. Risk assessment isn’t a once-a-year compliance ritual; it’s an ongoing process. Significant changes (new product launches, major incidents, scope changes) should trigger fresh assessment, and quarterly reviews of the top risks are realistic for most SMEs. A risk register dated 12 months ago, untouched since, signals a paper ISMS.

Producing a Statement of Applicability that doesn’t match the risk register. This is the single most common Clause 6 audit finding, in my experience. Risks identified in the register imply controls; controls in the SoA should trace back to risks. When the two documents disagree – a control marked “implemented” in the SoA that doesn’t appear anywhere in the risk treatment plan, or vice versa – the auditor will dig into why. Keep them aligned, or expect questions.

FAQs

Whatโ€™s the difference between a risk treatment plan and the Statement of Applicability?

The risk treatment plan lists how to address specific risks, while the SoA maps which controls (mainly from Annex A) youโ€™ve selected and why. The two documents should align but serve different purposes.

Can I accept risks in ISO 27001?

Yesโ€”but only if theyโ€™re within your defined risk acceptance criteria. Youโ€™ll need to document the rationale, and auditors will expect justification for why a risk was accepted rather than treated.

Do I need to include opportunities in the risk register?

No, ISO 27001 doesnโ€™t require a formal “opportunities register.” However, you should be able to demonstrate you considered opportunities (e.g. through objectives or project plans that enhance security). That said, it’s a good place to put them!

How often should I review my risk assessment?

At least annually or when significant changes occurโ€”like changes to systems, scope, threats, or legal requirements. A review is also a standard part of the management review process. However, I’d suggest quarterly risk reviews, especially to ensure progress on mitigation actions.

What happens if a control in the SoA is marked โ€˜Plannedโ€™ but not yet implemented?

Well, it depends on the auditor and approach. In my book, it’s fine if the risk is being actively managed. Auditors will look for evidence of interim measures, planned timelines, and consistency between the risk register, SoA, and treatment plan.


Includes all the mandatory document templates โ€” free, no commitment

Author Background

This article was written by Alan Parker, an ISO 27001 consultant and founder of Iseo Blue Limited. He helps UK SMEs achieve certification in 90 days or less, often without a dedicated security team or a large budget.

With over 30 years in IT governance and information security, Alan works with software companies, IT service providers, managed service providers, and professional services firms across the UK, Europe, and internationally.

Qualifications: ITIL v3 Expert, ITIL v4 Bridge, PRINCE2 Practitioner. Named IT Project Expert of the Year (2024, UK). Alan writes in plain English for busy teams who need to get things done.

Connect on LinkedIn or Bluesky, or explore his free ISO 27001 tools and templates at iseoblue.com. B.Sc (Hons) Information Systems, CISMP certified.